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1 Introduction
As an institution, social security has been around for more than a century, and is nearly
ubiquitous. Over the years, this institution has been called on to play different roles,
chiefly pension (or old-age support) and insurance (e.g., dependent survivor benefits
and income redistribution). These roles are, necessarily, somewhat entwined. But if one
asks, what makes social security unique as an institution, the answer would have to be
its pension role. Why? The other role, insurance, strictly speaking, does not need to be
played by social security: it may be played, for instance, by other institutions embody-
ing intragenerational means of income redistribution and social insurance. But social
security in its old-age support function is unique, the biggest intermediary of intergen-
erational transfers, the largest institution offering life-cycle, consumption smoothing
opportunities to all.1’2 This paper focuses solely on social security’s primal role of pro-
viding a public pension system, a role debated to this day among academic economists –
see Blake (2006) for a detailed discussion. It informs this debate by showing that a non-
paternalistic justification for a public pension system exists in a dynamically efficient
economy.
The debate started when researchers asked, why introduce a public pension system
into the mix if agents can use private capital markets to achieve desired levels of con-
sumption smoothing? Especially when capital markets offer a higher, safe return? Aaron
(1966) and Samuelson (1975) – henceforth, the Aaron-Samuelson result – showed that
the introduction of a public pension system has no welfare rationale if the economy is
initially dynamically efficient (i.e., if private capital markets offer a higher return that
the public system does). More correctly, a PAYG system in such a setting generates lower
1As Barnett et al. (2018) put it “[...] its principal identity is (and has always been) intergenerational,
its chief function, pension provision to the elderly. To reiterate, in its identity and function as the chief
intermediator of intergenerational transfers, social security is unique. [....] Interestingly, the issue of iden-
tifying a clear rationale for the creation of a public pension was center stage in political deliberations sur-
rounding U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) New Deal. FDR’s idea was to de-emphasize the
social-insurance aspect of the social security program – contributions and benefits are intentionally not
means-tested – and, instead, promote its public pension role. In 1935, the U.S. Congress created a national
payroll tax to pay for old-age pensions so as to not rely on funding from general tax revenues. FDR and So-
cial Security administrators took pains to distinguish the U.S. pension system from other welfare programs
by portraying the payroll tax not as a form of taxation but instead as a contribution workers made to ensure
their own security, an entitlement that people earned through hard work and their own contributions.”
2How does social security deliver consumption smoothing? Most public pension programs have a major
unfunded, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) component: the working, young are taxed and the proceeds finance a
periodic payment, a transfer (pension), to the existing retired elderly (defined benefit).
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long run welfare but offers a welfare gain to the inaugural, retired generation.3 Abel et
al. (1989) and Barbie et al. (2004) have argued that most developed economies are most
likely dynamically efficient ; by implication, a public PAYG pension system is not desir-
able even if they are popular in such countries.4
An approach to the why-do-public-pensions-exist question casts doubt on whether
people, in reality, achieve as much life-cycle consumption smoothing as they wished
they had. It turns out, not as much: many retirees experience a sharp drop in con-
sumption (more so, in the absence of any public pensions) even though retirement is
nearly perfectly anticipated.5’6 Guided by this sort of evidence, researchers have sug-
gested various “behavioral” modifications – present-bias (or more generally, time in-
consistency or lack of self control) – to the textbook model in an attempt to explain the
ineffective consumption smoothing. These modifications – see Findley and Caliendo
(2008) and Chetty (2015) – employ a) the notion that individuals are comprised of mul-
tiple selves, possibly in conflict with one another, and b) the construct of a rift between
a self’s “true preferences” (experienced utility), that which she uses to determine how
much she should save, versus her “choice” or “behavioral” preferences (decision utility),
3Interestingly the famous Beveridge report proposed a mandatory funded pension scheme, where con-
tributions paid over the work-life were to be set on an actuarial basis to ensure the pension would be above
some absolute poverty threshold. This scheme was not introduced since it would offer no pensions to those
already old, something which could be achieved by the universal PAYG pension, see e.g. Bozio et al. (2010).
Bismarck’s initial idea was also to establish a funded scheme, but for the same reason as in the UK, the
scheme was set-up as a PAYG scheme, see Scheubel (2013).
4In this paper, we are guided solely by the pension role played by a social security program, that too in
a certain world. Dynamic inefficiency is, of course, just one, among a long list of reasons, justifying social
security systems. Other rationales include risk sharing between or within generations (Smith, 1982; Enders
and Lapan, 1982; Gordon and Varian, 1988; Sinn, 2004), income redistribution (Diamond, 1977), or fixing
market failure in annuity markets (Diamond, 1977; Feldstein, 1990). The role played by unfunded pension
systems in ameliorating idiosyncratic risks (such as, those involving mortality or labor income) in worlds
with incomplete financial markets has been highlighted and surveyed in Krueger and Kubler (2006). Fuster,
Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2007) introduce bi-directional altruism along with mortality and earnings
risks in a framework similar to one adopted by Conesa and Krueger (1999). Cooley and Soares (1999) explore
a political-economy justification for PAYG pensions – see Galasso and Profeta (2004) for a survey.
5It has been documented that, among Americans 40-45 years of age, the median retirement account
balance is just $14,500 — less than 4% of what the median-income worker will require in savings to meet his
retirement needs. (Ghilarducci and James, 2018). Gillers et al (2018) cite a Wall Street Journal analysis that
finds "more than 40 percent of households headed by people aged 55 through 70 lack sufficient resources
to maintain their living standard in retirement.”
6Aguiar and Hurst (2013) challenge the “retirement-consumption” puzzle and shows that the decline in
consumption at retirement belies important heterogeneity across different types of consumption goods – a
large part of the consumption decline at retirement is driven by declines in food and work-related expenses
suggesting agents substitute away from market expenditures toward household production as the oppor-
tunity cost of time declines post retirement. See Olafsson and Pagel (2018) and Scott et al. (2020) for an
updated take on this puzzle. Our analysis is not about this puzzle.
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that which determines how much she actually saves. Intuitively, the idea here is that
an agent may choose “overconsumption” in the current and postpone saving for retire-
ment even though her “true” current self would not. This line of logic suggests a prima
facie case for paternalistic government intervention in the form of a public pension.7
What is not obvious, though, is whether paternalistic pension mandates actually pre-
vent the consumption drop at retirement because present-biased individuals can offset
the inherent forced saving by reducing, even eliminating, their own saving in response,
leaving retirement wealth unchanged, possibly lower – see Feldstein (1985), Laibson et
al. (1998), Feldstein and Liebman (2002), Imrohoroglu et al. (2003), Kaplow (2008), and
Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011). These behavioral contrivances, at the very least, do
not suggest a non-paternalistic role for government intervention.
Another approach to the why-do-public-pensions-exist question admits paternal-
ism on the part of the government but prevents the aforediscussed offset by assuming
agents face a borrowing constraint. In that case, present-biased individuals can, at most,
eliminate any voluntary retirement saving but may not borrow against future pension
payouts. In such a setting, as Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011) show, a paternalistic
welfare rationale for public PAYG pensions in dynamically efficient economies exists if
all private retirement saving by households is eliminated.8
The current paper is a generalization of the Aaron-Samuelson result and represents
the latest argument in the aforementioned debate. It unifies many decades of work in
this area under one umbrella by showing there may exist a non-paternalistic welfare ra-
tionale for public PAYG pensions in dynamically efficient economies and not all retire-
ment saving has to be socialized. To that end, it studies another behavioral modification
to textbook preferences – the reference-dependent or gain-loss utility setup of Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009; KR, hereafter).9 Here, in addition to consumption utility,
7Why saving through an unfunded public pension scheme and not a fully-funded one? Because the
latter does not address the immediate problem faced by the inaugural, retired generation. Interestingly the
famous Beveridge report proposed a mandatory funded pension scheme, where contributions paid over
the work-life were to be set on an actuarial basis to ensure the pension would be above some absolute
poverty threshold. This scheme was not introduced since it would offer no pensions to those already old,
something which could be achieved by the universal PAYG pension, see e.g. Bozio et al. (2010). Bismarck’s
initial idea was also to establish a funded scheme, but for the same reason as in the UK, the scheme was
set-up as a PAYG scheme, see Scheubel (2013).
8The analysis does not literally imply that all assets should be owned by pension funds. The paper fo-
cuses solely on pension/life-cycle saving for analytical clarity, and does not explicitly include other private
motives such as buffer-stock or liquidity motives.
9Pagel (2017) incorporates the KR framework into a large-scale macro model in an effort to offer a uni-
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the agent cares about “gain-loss utility” – whether she achieves a gain or loss in actual
consumption relative to a benchmark, a reference level she had erstwhile set for herself.
KR assume consumption gains please less than equivalent losses hurt. For our purposes,
the selling point of the KR setup is its ability to endogenously generate “overconsump-
tion” in pre-retirement years (a prelude to the consumption-drop that would ensue).10
Borrowing jargon from the literature on time-inconsistent references and from Kramer
(2016), we label agents as being sophisticated (naive) if they are aware their future self
cares (does not care) about gain-loss utility.11
The Aaron-Samuelson result is really an impossibility result. Our flagship result, by
contrast, shows that in a dynamically efficient, small-open KR economy populated by
naive agents, there is a welfare case for PAYG pensions and private retirement saving is
not fully crowded out.12 Ours is a possibility result, a further generalization of the Aaron-
Samuelson result to reference-dependent preferences. The bottom-line intuition is that
agents face a tension: on the one hand, the PAYG scheme hurts because it is return dom-
inated by competing, private saving instruments; on the other hand, the pension helps
to bring down the planned reference levels – the same consumption yields a bigger gain
than before, once the reference point is lower. In effect, the pension restricts the re-
sources available to the naive young agent thereby decreasing the reference consump-
tions set by her and, in turn, improving her life-time utility. This offers a novel under-
standing of the role played by pensions beyond their well-understood part in preventing
undersaving for retirement.
Another value-added to the pension literature is the following. As discussed before,
fied explanation for several empirical observations about lifecycle consumption: consumption responds to
income shocks with a lag, and the hump-shaped consumption profile observed in micro data.
10Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009) formulate a expectation-based, reference-dependent model and show that if
the weight on prospective gain-loss is smaller than contemporaneous gain-loss, the agent might overcon-
sume early relative to the optimal committed plan, increases immediate consumption following surprise
wealth increases, and delay decreasing consumption following surprise losses. In contrast, by introducing
borrowing constraints into the KR model, Kramer (2016) finds that reference dependence can increase op-
timal savings for people without access to credit because the expected future reference consumption will
increase in anticipation of a liquidity constraint and liquidity constrained agents might want to concen-
trate loss in early periods to avoid future losses. Note though Kramer (2016) assumes that the weight on
prospective gain-loss () or loss aversion () is large enough ( > 1) so that overconsumption relative to
pre-set reference points will not occur in his model.
11Also, this classification resonates with the literature on projection bias in predicting future utility
(Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, Rabin, 2003; DellaVigna, 2009).
12If, instead, agents were fully sophisticated and correctly anticipated the gain-loss concerns of their
future selves, then a welfare case for PAYG pensions exists only when all agents are borrowing constrained,
in which case all saving is necessarily socialized.
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behavioral biases generate differences between welfare from a policymaker’s perspec-
tive, which depends on an agent’s true utility (his actual well-being), and the agent’s
decision utility (the objective the agent maximizes when making choices). A paternalis-
tic policymaker uses the agent’s true utility as the yardstick and forces in a public PAYG
pension scheme. While the construct of true and choice preferences is no doubt of great
use, it leaves open the knotty issue of why governments would be paternalistic in the
first place, and why they would use the agent’s true and not her choice utility as the
right welfare measure. (There is the additional complexity about whether the electorate
votes with their true or their choice utility.) The current analysis stays away from this
true-choice construct entirely so as to generate a non-paternalistic rationale for a pub-
lic PAYG scheme.
What is critical to our result is the KR setup and two features therein. First, our result
obtains only when the current self is fully naive, unaware that her future selves’ prefer-
ences have gain-loss concerns.13 Such an agent believes (naively) her future selves will
honor the consumption plan she lays out for them. It is only in this case can the gov-
ernment help her out.14 Second, the general formulation of the gain-loss value function
has, in built, a diminishing sensitivity to the magnitude of gains and losses.15 The most
popular value function used in the literature (also in KR) is a two-part linear form, one
that eschews diminishing sensitivity. We show diminishing sensitivity is central to our
result.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates our basic model
within the KR framework while Section 3 derives the optimal saving decision and shows
that agents generally undersave (overconsume). Section 4 solves for the optimal pension
benefits. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of all results and other supplementary material is
13KR define a Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE) where each agent makes a reference consumption
plan that is consistent with future action (O’Donoghue and Sprenger, 2018). The PPE imposes a strong
restriction on the current decision maker’s belief; he/she must correctly anticipate the overconsumption
tendencies of her future selves and make a plan that will indeed be followed by these selves. In our language
(and that of Kramer, 2016), KR, at least in the main body of their paper, only allow for fully sophisticated
agents.
14A recent paper which studies the intergenerational redistribution effects of various social security
schemes under the KR framework is Park (2018), where the naivete of the young agent is also implicitly
assumed so that overconsumption occurs. Mostly, Park (2018) assumes a public PAYG pension system ex-
ists without questioning its raison d’être. Under logarithmic utility, he finds, just like we do, that a public
PAYG pension is welfare dominated by partially or fully-funded pensions if and only if the economy is dy-
namically efficient. For more general consumption utility forms, however, we find that a PAYG pension
could dominate the fully funded even if the economy is dynamically efficient.
15Diminishing sensitivity means a weakening reaction, for example, to marginal losses as losses get larger.
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in the appendix.
2 Themodel
2.1 Primitives
Consider a three-period, stationary overlapping-generations economy wherein a unit
mass of identical agents live through three phases: young, middle-aged and old; these
phases are called “selves”. Think of the young as a planning agent. Only in the middle
period, does the agent have income, w: The environment is fully deterministic and in a
steady state. Let cm (co) denote the actual consumption of her middle-aged (old) self.
Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) and Kramer (2016), the young self
makes consumption plans – reference points – for her middle-aged and old selves; let
(crm; c
r
o) denote any arbitrary reference point pair. When actual consumption by a self
exceeds what had been planned for that self, the agent experiences a gain in utility. Sim-
ilarly, the agents experiences a loss in utility if the opposite happens. Additionally, and
most importantly, losses hurt more than gains please. Let felicity from consumption be
given by the utility function, u(:); satisfying all standard assumptions including twice
differentiability, strictly increasing and strict concavity. In places below, we use the CES
form, u (c) = c
1 
1  ,  > 0:
2.1.1 Gain-loss utility
Conditional on having formed reference points (crm; c
r
o) when young, life-time utility for
the middle-aged self is given by
(1) 
mjcrm;cro = u (cm) +  (u (cm)  u (c
r
m)) +  [ (u (co)  u (cro)) + u (co)] ;  2 (0; 1]
where  is the subjective discount factor. 
m comprises of a standard part, utility gained
from the very act of consumption, u (cm) + u (co) ; and a gain-loss part captured by
the function () defined over the difference in utility between actual and planned con-
sumption, the utility gained or lost when one compares one’s actual consumption with
what had been planned.16 Contemporaneous gain-loss is captured by  (u (cm)  u (crm));
16In general,  (x) is assumed to have the following properties:
1.  (x) is continuous and strictly increasing for all x, twice differentiable for x 6= 0, and  (0) = 0.
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the other part,  (u (co)  u (cro)) ; is prospective and is, hence, discounted by  2 (0; 1).
Specifically, we work with gain-loss utility of the following form,
(2)  (x) =
(
G (x) ; if x  0;
 G ( x) ; if x < 0:
where Gx (x) > 0, Gxx (x) < 0, G (0) = 0, Gx+ (0) = Gx  (0)  Gx (0). The para-
meter  > 1 measures the degree of loss aversion. Then, for x  0 we have x (x) =
Gx (x) > 0, xx (x) = Gxx (x) < 0; for x < 0 we have x (x) = Gx ( x) > 0, xx(x) =
 Gxx( x) > 0. In words, this means when x > 0 (actual consumption exceeds what
had been planned), an agent experiences a gain in utility, G (x) : Similarly, they experi-
ence a loss in utility ( G ( x)) if the opposite happens. Additionally, since  > 1; losses
hurt more than gains please. Also, notice that agents are assumed to have a diminishing
sensitivity to the magnitude of gains and losses: xx (x) < 0 for x > 0 and xx(x) > 0
for x < 0: For gains (x > 0), this property is analogous to the assumption of diminishing
marginal utility. For losses (x < 0), to have diminishing sensitivity to marginal losses as
losses get larger is equivalent to  (x) being convex in this domain.
In one special case, we will study G (x) = x (x  0) and thus the gain-loss function,
 (x), is the two-part linear form, popular in the literature (O’Donoghue and Sprenger,
2018). Then,
(3)  (x) =
(
x; if x  0;
  ( x) ; if x < 0:
Note, the two-part linear form violates diminishing sensitivity. Later, we show why our
flagship result requires the diminishing sensitivity property. (See Proposition 1).
Another special functional form for G of interest is the constant elasticity form, i.e.,
 xGxx(x)Gx(x) is a constant. Consider, for example, an S-shaped gain-loss taking the following
2. If y > x  0, then  (y) +  ( y) <  (x) +  ( x) : (Loss Aversion For Large Stakes)
3. 00 (x)  0 for x > 0 and 00 (x)  0 for x < 0. Sometimes for simplicity we assume that 00 (x) = 0 for
all x 6= 0, denoted as 3’. (Diminishing Sensitivity: Risk averse above reference point and risk loving below
reference point)
4.
0 (0)
0+(0)
  > 1, where 0+ (0)  limx!0 
0
(jxj), 0  (0)  limx!0 
0
(  jxj). (Loss Aversion For Small
Stakes)
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form with  2 (0; 1):
(4)  (x) =
(
Ax, for x  0;
 A ( x) , for x < 0:
where xGxx=Gx = (1  ). This is used in Lemma 3 and in the numerics.
2.1.2 Budgets and pensions
The public sector offers a PAYG pension, b; to the old and finances it by a tax ( ) levied
on the middle-aged. Let s denote voluntary middle-age saving. An agent’s budget con-
straints when middle-aged and old are given by
cm = (1  )w   s; and(5)
co = Rs+ b;(6)
where R > 1 (dynamic efficiency) is the gross rate of return on saving, exogenously
specified and time-invariant. These budget constraints may be combined into a life-
time budget constraint,
(7) cm +
co
R
= (1  )w + b
R
 Y:
The budget constraint for the PAYG scheme is b = w (since there is no population
growth). The government is benevolent and selects a b that maximizes lifetime utility
of the middle-aged agent taking the decision rules of the agent as given.
For future use, a borrowing constraint is defined as s  0: The borrowing constraint
may or may not be binding. If b (think of this as forced saving) is sufficiently high, then
it may be that voluntary saving, s, is driven to zero: the borrowing constraint binds.
For even higher b; it is possible that s < 0 obtains: the agent in this case is borrowing
against his future pension. When the borrowing constraint is imposed, this last possibil-
ity cannot arise.17 In that case, voluntary saving is equal to zero, and any post-retirement
consumption is financed by the public sector.18 Henceforth, assume the borrowing con-
17Many countries with PAYG systems, such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the United States ex-
plictly disallow their citizens to borrow against their future pension. Practically, this makes sense since a
PAYG pension payout is “legally not transferable; no lender can have any say in its ownership, the borrower’s
retirement date, and so on.” (Andersen and Bhattacharya, 2011)
18We urge the reader not to take the “voluntary saving is equal to zero, and any saving for retirement is
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straint is not imposed.
For future use, define the double positive result as one where in equilibrium, the
optimal PAYG public pension is strictly positive and the associated private retirement
saving, s, is also strictly positive. Recall, a borrowing constraint requires private saving
to be weakly positive, s  0: So, if the borrowing constraint binds, then by definition,
a double positive result cannot obtain. For completeness sake, in Appendix A, we state
and prove the Aaron-Samuelson result, where the double positive result does not obtain.
It also does not obtain with myopic agents as shown in Proposition 2 in Andersen and
Bhattacharya (2011).
2.2 Timing and equilibrium
The timeline of decision making is as follows. The young self makes consumption plans
for her future selves, crm and c
r
o respectively (and hence, by implication, plans for her
middle aged self to save, sr). These plans are chosen to maximize (1) subject to her own
beliefs about her middle-aged self’s decision problem. The middle-aged self chooses cm
and saving, s; so as to maximize (1) given crm and c
r
o. The old self has no choice but to
consume her gross interest income, Rs; where s is chosen by her past, middle-aged self,
and a possible pension, b. If cm 6= crm; it will turn out that co 6= cro: But co will exactly
match the consumption plan made for the old self by her previous, middle-aged self.
It is time to define an equilibrium in this model. First, the young self chooses (crm; c
r
o)
based on her beliefs about the preferences of her future selves. The middle-aged self will
choose cm taking as given the young self’s plans, (crm; c
r
o). Thereafter, she updates her
consumption plan from (crm; c
r
o) to (cm; R (w   cm)) according to rational expectations.
A plan is called an optimal consistent plan (OCP) if it satisfies the above description and
the consumption plan made by the young self is implemented by the middle-aged self if
the latter’s preferences are the same as what the young imagined they would be.19
“socialized”” too literally. Obviously, this is an artifact of the simple nature of the model. Recall, our focus
is solely on saving-for-retirement. If other saving motives (precautionary, demand for liquidity) are added
or there is private and public physical capital, the statement will no longer be true.
19In the online appendix of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009), they point out that “since it is unlikely that a person
would hold correct beliefs about all future contingencies from the moment of birth, and adjusting beliefs
carries utility in our model, the question arises whether and in what situations she would actually arrive
at PPE beliefs. In this appendix, we modify the model in the text to allow for unrestricted initial beliefs
when the decisionmaker forms the first focused plans, and study the implications of rationality given our
assumptions about preferences with minimal ancillary assumptions.” This paper proceeds in a similar way
by assuming the young agent is naive yet keeping the rationality part intact for the other selves.
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A quick road map of where we are headed is in order. First, we compute the ac-
tual consumption choices of the middle-aged self where they take as given the reference
points “sent up” from their past self. These issues are covered in Section 3.1. Further be-
low, in Section 3.2, we ask, how do the young decide on which reference points to send
up? This, as will turn out, will depend crucially on their beliefs about the preferences of
their middle-aged self. Also, we would like to know if and when the middle-aged over-
consumes relative to these plans. Next section, we will study if PAYG pensions help or
hurt in this environment.
3 Consumption plans
3.1 Consumption plans of themiddle-aged self
Using the specification of the gain-loss utility (2), life-time utility can be written as
(8)

mjcrm;cro =
(
u (cm) +G [u (cm)  u (crm)]  G [u (cro)  u (co)] + u (co) ; for cm > crm
u (cm)  G [u (crm)  u (cm)] + G [u (co)  u (cro)] + u (co) ; for cm  crm
:
The middle-aged takes (crm; c
r
o) as given and chooses consumption cm and saving s to
maximize her life-time utility (1) subject to the budget constraints (5) and (6). Since
our primary focus is on the possibility of “overconsumption” or undersaving, we look at
cm > c
r
m (, s < sr). Define
gm  u (cm)  u (crm) ;(9)
lo    [u (co)  u (cro)] :(10)
The first order condition for saving reads20
(11)
@
m
@s

cm>crm
=   [1 +Gx (gm)]uc (cm) +  [1 + Gx (lo)]Ruc (co) = 0;
where G (gm) is the utility gain and enters with a positive sign, while G (lo) enters with
a negative sign signifying a utility loss since cm > crm implies co < c
r
o. The first term
20Since we have defined G (x) before, we use Gx () to denote its derivative. For ease of representation,
let Gx (gm)  Gx (x) jx=gm , and Gx (lo)  Gx (x) jx=lo .
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on the r.h.s. of eq. (11) is the marginal cost of saving more in terms of both forgone
consumption as middle-aged and the lost gain, Gx (gm) : The second term captures the
marginal gain of having more consumption as old including the prospective gain. From
(11), it follows
(12) uc (cm)  Ruc (co) ;
where
(13)  (gm; lo)  1 + Gx (lo)
1 +Gx (gm)
:
An interior solution (cm; co) is ensured by standard assumptions on u(). For future use,
the second order condition of the middle-aged self’s problem is
d2
m
ds2
= [1 +Gx (gm)]ucc (cm) + [1 + Gx (lo)]R
2ucc (co)(14)
+Gxx (gm) [uc (cm)]
2   Gxx (lo)R2 [uc (co)]2 < 0:
It bears emphasis here that  is an endogenous variable, best thought of as a wedge
arising from the gain-loss effect. Since  and  enter side by side in (12), they play similar
roles: higher  (and higher ) is associated with higher saving (cm decreases). A higher 
(since it does not enter the budget) releases only a substitution effect, while a change in
R releases both a substitution and an income effect.
Having stated the middle-aged’s choice problem, we need to characterize the opti-
mal determination of (crm; c
r
o) before proceeding further.
3.2 Consumption plans of the young self
The decision problem for the young self is given by
(15) max
crm;c
r
o

y = u (c

m) +  (u (c

m)  u (crm)) +  [ (u (co)  u (cro)) + u (co)]
The question is, does the young self realize that actual choices made by her future selves,
cm and co; depend on the reference levels crm and cro she will set? If the young self is fully
naive, she believes that cm = crm and co = cro will hold. In effect, she believes her future
selves will stick to her plan and choose cm = crm and co = cro even when no commitment
11
technology is used. She, in other words, (naively) believes she has full commitment.
Another way to say this is, a naive agent believes there is no gain-loss component to future
utility.
If, at the other extreme, she is fully sophisticated, she believes that the actual choices
made by her future selves, cm and co; will be given by cm =  (crm) and co =  (cro) – she
knows what  () is and takes it into account when choosing crm and cro: Sophisticated
agents are forward looking (rational expectations) and only form time-consistent plans.
This is what Koszegi and Rabin (2009) define as a PPE-equilibrium.21 A sophisticated
agent believes there will be a gain-loss unless he/she does something to prevent it. Recall,
there is never any gain-loss utility for the old.
Note that the optimal full-commitment (naive) consumption plan (crm ; cro ) satisfies
(16) uc (crm )  Ruc (cro ) ;
and the corresponding saving is sr = w   b  crm :
3.2.1 Consumption plans by the middle-aged when the young are naive: Overcon-
sumption
How does welfare of the middle-aged vary with the levels of the reference points? No-
tice, that the optimal committed plans (crm ; cro ) must satisfy
@crm
@cro
=   1R , cf. the budget
constraint (7). Employing the optimal committed plan (16) and the first-order condition
of the middle-aged (12), we have that
@
m
@crm
= [(1 + Gx (lo))u

c (co)R  uc (cm) (1 +Gx (gm))]
@s
@crm
+RGx (lo)uc (c
r
o ) Gx (gm)uc (crm )
= [Gx (lo) Gx (gm)]uc (crm ) :
21Our analysis also adds a bit more to a crucial question in prospect theory: how to discipline the deter-
mination of the reference points. KR define a Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE) where each agent makes
a reference consumption plan that is consistent with future action (O’Donoghue and Sprenger, 2018). The
PPE imposes a strong restriction on the current decision maker’s belief; he/she must correctly anticipate
the overconsumption tendencies of her future selves and make a plan that will indeed be followed by these
selves. In our language (and that of Kramer, 2016), KR only allow for fully sophisticated agents. We broaden
the discussion by allowing the current decision maker to be naive in the sense that she believes her future
preferences are of the textbook kind with no gain-loss concerns. Such an agent believes (naively) she can
commit to her consumption plan.
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Since (crm ; cro ) maximizes u(cm) + u(co) it follows that
u(crm ) + u(c
r
o ) > u(cm) + u(co)
for any consumption pair (cm; co) 6= (crm ; cro ). Therefore,
lo = u(c
r
o )  u(co) > u(cm)  u(crm ) = gm
and since Gxx () < 0; it follows
Gx (0) > Gx(gm) > Gx (lo) .
Using  (gm; lo)  1+Gx(lo)1+Gx(gm) ; it follows that for  < 1;  < 1: It follows that
(17) sign

@
m
@crm

= sign [Gx (lo) Gx (gm)] < 0 for  < 1
This means for  < 1, higher reference consumption reduces life-time utility of the
middle-aged if the plan set by the young is the optimal committed plan.
We wish to know if and when the middle-aged self will actually overconsume relative
to the optimal committed consumption plan crm . Evaluating
@
m
@s

s=sr and using (12),
we get
@
m
@s

s=sr
= (  1)Ruc (cro)Gx (0)  0 iff  < 1:
Notice  plays no role in the decision to overconsume; henceforth, in many places, we
set  = 1:What is interesting here is that overconsumption/undersaving, in the sense of
consuming more (saving less) than previously planned, is possible in the KR gain-loss
environment. Whether this is the case depends singularly on the gain-loss parameters
() and discounting (). Interestingly, it also responds to the pension scheme and the
market rate of interest.
Lemma 1 Given the consumption plan (crm ; cro ) set by the naive young self,
cnm = c

m > c
r
m for  < 1
cnm = c

m = c
r
m for   1
;
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This means, the middle-aged self consumes more than what her naive young self planned
she would if  < 1:
3.2.2 Consumption plans by themiddle-aged when the young are sophisticated
Recall, any middle-aged agent uses (12)-(13) to determine her consumption choices,
(cm; co) : If the young are sophisticated, their optimal choice of reference plans, (csrm ; csro ) ;
would satisfy (12) where22
cm = c
sr
m , gm = 0;
co = c
sr
o , lo = 0;
The following lemma is a restatement of the overconsumption result in KR.
Lemma 2 [Köszegi and Rabin (2009)] If   1, young sophisticated agents choose the
same full commitment consumption plan (crm ; cro ) that is chosen by the naive young self.
If  < 1, sophisticated agents choose reference points (csrm ; c
sr
o ) = (c

m; c

o) where
cm > c
r
m
holds, and (cm; co) satisfies equation (12) with
 (gm; lo) =
1 + Gx (0)
1 +Gx (0)
 s < 1:
This means if   1, there is no incentive to overconsume; the naive and the sophis-
ticated set the same plans. When  < 1, sophisticated agents choose reference points
(csrm ; c
sr
o ) that do not coincide with the full commitment plan of the naive, (c
r
m ; c
r
o ) ; in-
deed, the actual consumption of the middle aged under the reference points (csrm ; c
sr
o )
exceeds what the full commitment plan (crm ; cro ) deemed to be right.
In comparison, if the young is fully naive, she will believe
cm = c
nr
m
co = c
nr
o
22We use superscript “s” to denote “sophisticated”, and let “sr” denote the reference if the agent is so-
phisticated. Analogously, we use “n” and “nr” to represent “naive”.
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and hence, she will believe gm = 0 and lo = 0: It will turn out that cm > cnrm , gm > 0
and co < cnro , lo > 0:
4 Optimal PAYG pensions
Inadequate retirement saving is usually understood to be the main reason for govern-
ment intervention in the form of pension schemes. We have shown that KR-style gain-
loss preferences may generate such undersaving. Now, we turn to questions such as,
how does a public pension system affect private (under) saving? Is there a welfare ratio-
nale for government intervention via a pension system? Specifically, does there exist a
positive optimal pension alongside positive voluntary saving, i.e., does the double posi-
tive result obtain?
Below, we study these questions for the fully naive agent. (Separately, in Appendix
(C), we show that the double-positive result does not obtain for fully sophisticated agents,
i.e., d
mdb < 0 for a fully sophisticated agent.
23).
To set the scene, consider, first, the basic channel through which a PAYG pension
may be successful in addressing the undersaving problem. The optimality condition of
the naive, middle-aged reads: uc (cnm)  Ruc (cno ) : Recall  (< 1) is an endogenous
variable, a wedge arising from the gain-loss effect that impels a naive agent to over-
consume. The lower is , the more consumption is front-loaded, the more severe is the
undersaving. If b could help raise ; then the overconsumption problem would be some-
what mitigated. It turns out the effect of b on  is, in general, too messy to be useful; but
for the constant-elasticity gain-loss G function (4), a very precise result obtains.
Lemma 3 For CES utility with  > 1, the constant-elasticity gain-loss G function (4) and
 < 1, we have
d
db
> 0:
Therefore, the equilibrium actual consumption ratio c
n
o
cnm
is increasing in b, and the ratio of
actual to reference consumption c
n
m
cnrm
as middle-aged is declining in b.
23A welfare case for PAYG pensions for fully-sophisticated agents can be found in the presence of a bind-
ing borrowing contraint. In this case, the optimal public pension is positive but private retirement saving
is zero. This is discussed in an Appendix (D).
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In this case, an increase in b raises  reducing the distortion from gain-loss concerns;
the overconsumption problem is less severe, as is the discrepancy between actual and
reference consumptions when middle-aged. While this offers some intuition for why a
public pension may help the undersaving problem, by itself it does not prove there is a
welfare case for such a pension since consumption levels are also affected. We now turn
to this issue.
The effect of pensions b on life-time utility (using (12)) can be written as
(18)
d
m
db
= [1 +Gx (g
n
m)]uc (c
n
m)

1 R
R

| {z }
return effect
 Gx (gnm)uc (cnrm )
@cnrm
@b
  Gx (lno )uc (cnro )
@cnro
@b| {z }
reference consumption effect
:
The first term is the standard return effect underlying the classic Aaron-Samuelson
result, and in a dynamically efficient economy, it is negative. Obviously, sans gain-loss
effects (Gx (gnm) = Gx (l
n
o ) = 0), the reference consumption effect is zero and
d
m
db  0 :
there is no welfare case for a PAYG pension when R > 1: The reference-consumption
effect (the two last terms in (18)), is new and appears due to the gain-loss feature. It is
immediate that a necessary condition for a welfare case for pensions (d
mdb > 0 for some
b) requires the reference-consumption effect to be positive.
Lemma 4
(19)
@snr (b)
@b
=   ucc (c
nr
m ) +Rucc (c
nr
o )
ucc (cnrm ) +R2ucc (cnro )
2

 1;  1
R

;
@cnrm
@b
=  1  snrb (b) =  
R (R  1)ucc (cnro )
ucc (cnro ) +R2ucc (cnro )
< 0;(20)
@cnro
@b
= 1 +Rsnrb (b) =  
(R  1)ucc (cnrm )
ucc (cnro ) +R2ucc (cnro )
< 0;(21)
implying, the introduction of pensions will always decrease the reference consumptions
chosen by the naive.
The lower the reference level, the less the “temptation” to overconsume, and there-
fore the reference-consumption effect in (18) is positive.
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4.1 Double-positive result
The necessary condition is, thus, always fulfilled, leaving it possible that there is a wel-
fare case for the pension. But does the reference-consumption effect dominate the re-
turn effect? To address this question, note from (18)
(22)
d
m
db
=

1 R
R

f[1 +Gx (gnm)]uc (cnm)  Gx (gnm)uc (cnrm )  [1  ] Gx (lno )uc (cnrm )g ;
where
(23)   R
2ucc (c
nr
o )
ucc (cnrm ) +R2ucc (cnro )
2 [0; 1] :
The optimality condition of the government,d
mdb = 0; can be simplified to
(24)
uc (c
n
m)
uc (cnrm )
=
Gx(g
n
m) + [1  ] Gx (lno )
1 +Gx(gnm)
:
More analytical progress is possible with the CES form u (c) = c1 = (1  ) : In that case,
we have  = R
1 1=
1+R1 1= . Define
(25) F ()  1 + 
 1R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
 
 
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
!
;
then (24) implies an optimal b solves
(26) F () =
1
1 + Gx (lno )
:
It is instructive to reformulate (26) and (13) as follows:
  1 + Gx (l
n
o )
1 +Gx (gnm)
=
1 + Gx (A(;R; )C)
1 +Gx (B(;R; )C)
;(27)
F () =
1
1 + Gx (lno )
=
1
1 + Gx (A(;R; )C)
;(28)
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where
A(;R; )  1
   1
"
1
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 
 

1
1 +R1 1=
1 #
R1   0;
B(;R; )  1
   1
24  R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
!1 
 
 
 1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
!1 35  0:
For future use, define (; C) to be a solution to (27)-(28).
Lemma 5 Suppose  < 1 and the gain-loss function, G; satisfies Gx (0) > Gx (0), where
Gx (0) is defined by
F

1 + Gx (0)
1 +Gx (0)

 1
1 + Gx (0)
:
Then, there exists a w-independent solution (; C) to (27)-(28).
The possibility of a b > 0, if indeed validated, would be interesting for two reasons.
First, in contrast to models with myopia, it would not require a distinction to be made
between true and choice preferences. Secondly, a welfare case could potentially arise
for positive voluntary saving (i.e., unlike Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011) and others,
would not require private retirement saving to be driven to the zero corner). We start by
laying out an impossibility result.
Proposition 1 a) If   1, there is no welfare role for pensions.
b) If the gain-loss utility takes the two-part linear form as in (3), the “double-positive”
result does not obtain.
Finally, we are able to state our flagship, double-positive, possibility result.
Proposition 2 (“Double positive result”) Define
w = (C)
1
1  ;
w 
h
1 + () 1= R 1=
i
R (C)
1
1 
1 + () 1= R1 1=
:
The “double positive” result holds when w 2 [w;w], i.e., in this range of w; positive pen-
sions and positive private retirement saving coexists; for w < w, saving is positive but
18
there is no welfare role for pensions; for w > w, there is a role for positive pensions but
private saving is negative24.
Recall, the weight on prospective gain-loss utility should be small enough ( < 1)
such that overconsumption occurs (Lemma 1). This is a necessary condition for gov-
ernment intervention. The rest are a set of sufficient assumptions ensuring the double
positive result. Let us go over some bits of intuition for these conditions.
First,  > 1: Lemma 3 argues this ensures  is increasing in b, that is, the interven-
tion reduces the overconsumption problem; the ratio of consumption as middle-aged
relative to consumption as old declines.
Second, the gain-loss part should be significant (Gx (0) >Gx (0)) implying that there
is a strong incentive to front-load consumption, or put differently, the overconsump-
tion problem should be sufficiently severe. For there to be a welfare effect for the PAYG
pension, see (18), we know that the reference consumption effect should dominate the
classical return effect known from the Aaron-Samuleson result. This can happen only
when the gain-loss part is significant enough.
Finally, and crucial for the double positive result, income has opposite effects on
pensions and savings under the optimal policy. The optimal pension is increasing in
income since the incentive to frontload consumption is stronger, the higher the income.
A positive pension, therefore, requires a sufficiently high income (w). On the other hand,
the pension crowds out saving, and this effect is clearly stronger, the larger the pension.
Hence, for income levelsw < w; voluntary saving is positive, and for a high level (w > w),
it is negative. It follows that the double positive result only arises for intermediary level
of income (w 2 [w;w]). For even higher levels of income, pensions remain positive, but
voluntary saving is not – the double positive result no longer obtains. Note, it is always
the case that w > w , i.e., there is always a range of income levels producing the double
positive result.
4.2 Numerics
Our flagship result, Proposition 2 outlines a set of necessary (and sufficient) conditions
required to obtain the double positive result. To ensure that the restriction set is indeed
24Introducing a borrowing constraint could also deliver a welfare role for pensions when it is binding.
This is studied in Appendix (E).
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non-empty, and to illustrate our finding, we showcase a numerical example. To that end,
we set the parameters as follows:
R = 1:02^25;  = 0:1;  = 2; w = 10;  = 3:
This is just one set; numerous other sets generate qualitatively similar results. We as-
sume the G function takes the constant elasticity form as in (4) with A = 1:42 and
 = 0:5: In this case,
bn = 2:30; sn = 1:34; snr = 2:40;
cnm = 6:35; c
n
o = 4:51; c
nr
m = 5:30; c
nr
o = 6:25:
Clearly, the optimal b and optimal private retirement saving are both strictly positive.
The effect of b on lifetime utility 
m and  can be seen in Figure 1, where 
m is concave
and  is increasing in b. Consequently, compared with the case without pensions, the
consumption ratio c
n
o
cnm
increased by 0:8%.
Figure 1: 
m and  against b
20
Also, the size of pension depends on w, which can be seen in Figure 2. For low lev-
els of income, no welfare role for pensions can be found and private saving is positive;
for intermediate levels of income, the double-positive result obtains; for high levels of
income, a role for positive pensions exists but private saving is negative.
Figure 2: Various endogenous variables as a function of w
Finally, our result does not rely on the constant elasticity form. We can show, numer-
ically, that if we adopt the expected S-shaped gain-loss of the following form
 (x) =
(
A Ae x, for x  0;
  (A Aex) , for x < 0: ;
the double-positive result obtains. As before, the parameters are set as
R = 1:02^25;  = 0:01;  = 2; w = 10;  = 3; A = 13:721;  = 0:5;
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The optimal solutions are
bn = 2:59; sn = 0:89; snr = 2:18;
cnm = 6:53; c
n
o = 4:04; c
nr
m = 5:23; c
nr
o = 6:17:
The effect of b on lifetime utility 
m and  can be seen from the following Figure 3.
Consequently, compared with the case without pensions, the consumption ratio c
n
o
cnm
in-
creased by 3:3  10 5.
Figure 3: 
m and  against b in general
For different levels of income w we have similar results as before (See Figure 4).
22
Figure 4: Endogeneous variables against w in general
5 Conclusion
The pension role of social security is paramount and unique to all the roles it has been
called on to play. This paper contributes to a long line of research studying the long-
run optimality of the pension role of PAYG social security in deterministic, dynamically
efficient economies. Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1975) had shown an impossibility
result: the introduction of such a pension system can improve the stationary welfare of
all two-period lived agents if and only if the economy is initially dynamically inefficient.
Parenthetically, there is no welfare justification for introducing a PAYG pension scheme
if the economy is initially dynamically efficient.
Numerous attempts, thereafter, have been made to generate a possibility result: af-
ter all, PAYG pensions are immensely popular in the real world and in economies that
are dynamically efficient. Broadly speaking, most of these attempts rely either on the as-
sumption of time-inconsistent preferences or, more generally, the construct of a chasm
between true and choice utility. In such settings, it is indeed possible for a paternalis-
23
tic government to usher in welfare-improving PAYG pensions but all private retirement
saving has to be eliminated (and retirement consumption socialized). This paper repre-
sents another step in this agenda. It chases after the “holy grail” so to speak: generating a
non-paternalistic rationale for public PAYG pensions in a dynamically efficient economy
where private retirement saving is positive. It finds that in the KR world of reference-
dependent preferences, if agents are naive (unaware of the impending gain-loss their
future self is about to face), then, under some reasonable parametric restrictions, the
so-called holy grail is reached.
The analysis has been silent on the issue of transition dynamics to a steady state with
the optimal pension, b: Starting from laissez faire, how should such a pension system
be initialized, knowing that the inaugural generation of retired individuals will receive
a pension never having paid into the system? Further along, the sort of crowding-out
issues we have discussed will appear as private agents cut private retirement saving in
response to the public scheme. Their consumption benchmarks will also change along
the transition. While these issues are of tremendous practical importance, we believe
they are best left for future work. Some of these transition hurdles in different contexts
are studied in Andersen and Bhattacharya (2017) and in the recent work by Bishnu et al.
(2020).
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APPENDICES
A Aaron-Samuelson result
In the general case, the agent’s problem is to maximize u(cm; co) subject to (5)-(6). The
first order conditions to the agent’s problem reads ucm () = Ruco () for a solution in
the interior, i.e., the optimal s > 0: The optimal cm and co are cm (b; w) and co (b; w) and
long-run indirect utility of the agent is given by u (cm (b; w) ; co (b; w)) : Notice
@u (cm (b; w) ; co (b; w))
@b
= ucm ()

1  @s
@b

+ uco ()

R
@s
@b
+ 1

which using ucm () = Ruco () yields
(29)
@u (cm (b; w) ; co (b; w))
@b
=

1 R
R

ucm () :
Since ucm () > 0; it follows that for R > 1; @u(c

m(b;w);c

o(b;w))
@b < 0 , b = 0 implying an
interior b cannot co-exist (ruling out negative pensions). In other words, there is no
welfare case for an optimal positive PAYG pension whenR > 1: This is the classic Aaron-
Samuelson result. Under dynamic efficiency, and standard preferences, PAYG pensions
are return-dominated by the market interest rate, and hence are never optimal in terms
of long-run welfare.
In the rest of the paper, we will stay away from introducing the construct of true and
choice preferences and borrowing constraints; after all, our goal is to look for a non-
paternalistic rationale for public pensions consistent with positive voluntary savings. In
this appendix, however, we bring it in only to outline what is known in the literature
that allows for disagreement between choice and true utility and the role played by the
borrowing constraint. To that end, let the utility be separable and let choice utility of the
middle be given by u (cm; co) = u (cm)+u (co) and the true utility by 
 (cm; co) = u (cm)+
u (co). In that case, we say the agent is myopic if  < , and there is undersaving in
the sense that savings chosen under choice preferences fall short of the optimal level
under true preferences (Andersen and Bhattacharya, 2011). Continue to assume the
government is benevolent but, in addition, assume the government is paternalistic and
uses 
 (cm; co) to inform its decisions.
As before, the agent takes b as given and solves uc () = Ruc () to compute optimal
interior savings, s (b) and consumptions, cm (b; w) ; co (b; w). The PAYG pension crowds
out voluntary savings, specifically in equilibrium
@s
@b
=   ucc (w   s  b) +Rucc (Rs+ b)
ucc (w   s  b) +R2ucc (Rs+ b) < 0
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and 1 < @s@b <   1R . The optimal pension, b; is chosen by setting
@
 (cm (b; w) ; co (b; w))
@b
= 
cm ()

 1  @s
 (b)
@b

+
co ()

R
@s (b)
@b
+ 1

 0 for R > 1:
Introducing a behavioral explanation for undersaving does not as such overturn the
Aaron-Samuelson result, there is still no welfare rationale for the PAYG pension under
dynamic efficiency. The reason is that the pension is return dominated and crowds out
voluntary savings. Due to the crowding out it follows, that there is a level of pensions so
high that individuals would want to borrow. This happens if
uc(w   b) > Ruc(b)
Hence, for a pension b  b (b : uc(w   b) = Ruc(b) voluntary savings is negative
s < 0. Next impose a non-borrowing constraint (s  0) it follows that true utility is
u (w   b) + u (b) for b  b, implying an optimal pension b satisfying
uc(w   b) = uc(b)
The welfare case for a positive pension in the presence of a borrowing constraint de-
pends on the necessary condition R < , that is, the present bias should be suffi-
ciently strong. In addition it is required that true utility for b = b exceeds true utility for
b = 0, see Andersen and Bhattacharya, 2011) for details. The bottomline is that behav-
ioral "imperfections" give a rationale for PAYG pension only if the borrowing constraint
is binding implying that positive PAYG pensions and voluntary savings do not coexist.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the allocation (crm ; cro ) determined by (16), the optimal committed consump-
tion plan. First, we show that for   1, there is no incentive for the sophisticated to
deviate from this plan. From (11) we have
@
m
@s

cm>crm
=   [1 +Gx (gm)]uc (cm) +  [1 + Gx (lo)]Ruc (co)
Employing the first-order conditions of the young and the middle-aged (16), we have
that
@
m
@s

cm>crm;cm=c
r
m
=   [1 +Gx (0)]uc (crm ) +  [1 + Gx (0)]Ruc (cro )
= [  1]Gx (0)uc (crm )
Hence, for   1 there is no incentive to save less to accomplish a consumption level as
middle-aged above crm . Second, for  < 1, it follows that the allocation (crm ; cro ) cannot
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be implemented, since there is an incentive to decrease consumption to achieve higher
consumption as middle-aged than crm . The sophisticated agent knows that for given
reference consumption levels (crm) optimal consumption plan is determined by
uc (c

m)  Ruc (co)
where
 (gm; lo)  1 + Gx (lo)
1 +Gx (gm)
and the only PPE-equilibrium has cm = crm which is determine by the above condition
for  (0; 0)  1+Gx(0)1+Gx(0) .
C No double positive result for sophisticated agents
For sophisticated agents, the choice as middle-aged exactly matches the reference con-
sumption set when young, that is, csm = c
sr
m ; c
s
o = c
sr
o : The first order condition reads
 uc(w   ss   b) [1 +Gx (0)] +R [1 + Gx (0)]uc(Rss + b) = 0;
from which we get
dss
db
=   [1 +Gx (0)]ucc(c
s
m) +R [1 + Gx (0)]ucc(c
s
o)
[1 +Gx (0)]ucc(csm) +R
2 [1 + Gx (0)]ucc(cso)
2

 1;  1
R

:
Also, the higher the pension benefits, the lower the voluntary saving, which in turn af-
fects consumption as middle-aged and old,
@csm
@b
=  

1 +
dss
db

=
R (1 R) [1 + Gx (0)]ucc(cso)
[1 +Gx (0)]ucc(csm) +R
2 [1 + Gx (0)]ucc(cso)
< 0;
@cso
@b
= R
dss
db
+ 1 =
(1 R) [1 +Gx (0)]ucc(csm)
[1 +Gx (0)]ucc(csm) +R
2 [1 + Gx (0)]ucc(cso)
< 0:
The lifetime utility 
sm is

sm = u(w   b  ss) +G(0)  G(0) + u(Rss + b);
while the effect of pensions on life-time utility is
d
sm
db
=  uc(csm)

dss
db
+ 1

+ uc(c
s
o)

R
dss
db
+ 1

< 0:
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Therefore, there is no role for pensions if agents are sophisticated and there is interior
savings.
In the Online Appendix we show that under a borrowing constraint there may be a
welfare case for a positive PAYG pension. Voluntary savings is fully crowded out, and this
does not deliver the "double" result of positive pensions and voluntary savings.
D Optimal pension for sophisticated agents at a corner
The preceding assumes that voluntary savings is determined by (12) with s. However,
due to the crowding out of voluntary savings, there is a pension level (b) so high that vol-
untary savings is non-positive. In the pensions literature it is customary to impose the
condition that voluntary pension savings must be non-negative (s  0), since borrowing
with future public pensions (b) as collateral is not possible. This constraint is important
for finding a welfare rationale for PAYG pensions in settings with myopic indviduals or
self-control problems, see discussion in Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011). In the preset
setting, the zero savings corner is reached if b  b defined by
uc(w   b) [1 +Gx(0)] = R [1 + Gx(0)]uc(b):
Is it possible by choosing a b sufficiently high that there is a welfare case for the PAYG
pension? If s = 0, we have
d
m
db
=  uc(csm) + uc(cso)
and from the corner condition for savings, it follows that
0 =  uc(csm) + uc(cso) <

1 R1 + Gx(0)
1 +Gx(0)

uc(c
s
o)
, R < 1 +Gx(0)
1 + Gx(0)
=
1
s
:
Since s  1+Gx(0)1+Gx(0) > , it is a necessary condition that R < 1 for d
mdb > 0 to be
possible. Notice, that in models with myopia, it is also a requirement that R is not too
large for pensions to be welfare improving. It follows straightforwardly, that the optimal
pension bs solves  uc(csm) + uc(cso) = 0 implying that bs = w2 . To conclude whether a
pension is welfare improving we also need to compare 
mjb=0 with 
mjb=bs .
Notice that when the zero-savings constraint is binding, the optimal policy is effec-
tively maximizing commitment utility. A high pension (making the zero savings corner
binding) is thus a commitment device, and the analysis considers whether the sophisti-
cated agents are better off under this commitment policy. The cost of the policy is that
the implicit savings in the PAYG scheme has a lower return than the market return. In
models with myopia, the distinction between true and choice utility is important and
raises difficult issues. The preceding shows that there may be a welfare case for PAYG
pension without this distinction, and it hinges on the commitment value being higher
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than the implicit cost in terms of a lower rate of return.
Suppose
u (c) =
c1 
1   ;G (x) = A Ae
 x:
Under pensions b = 0; the FOC (12) with s gives
cm =
 1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
w; co =
R
1 +  1=R1 1=
w;
The life-time utility will be

mjb=0 = u (cm) +G [u (cm)  u (csrm)]  G [u (csro )  u (co)] + u (co)
=
1
1  w
1 
24  1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
!1 
+

R
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 35 :
If b = bs;

mjb=bs = u(csm) +G(0)  G(0) + u(cso)
= 2
(w=2)1 
1   :
A welfare role for pensions also requires 
mjb=bs > 
mjb=0; which gives
2
(w=2)1 
1   > w
1 	 (R) ;
where
	 (R) =
1
1  
24  1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
!1 
+

R
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 35 :
If  = 1, the above equation cannot hold, which means that the log utility cannot
deliver a role for pensions.
If  > 1, 	 (R) is an increasing function of R. Employing the above condition and
letting R! 1 , we have
2 1 < (1 + ) 1 ,  > 1;
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which is impossible. Letting R! 1, we have
2 <
 
 1=
1 +  1=
!1 
+

1
1 +  1=
1 
=

1 + 1=
 1
+

1 +  1=
 1
;
which might hold. This indicates that for  > 1, we need the gross interest rate not to
be very large
 
R < 1

: Also,  should also be small, which implies that the weight on
gain-loss Gx (0) should be large and the weight on second-period gain-loss  should
be small.
If  < 1, letting R! 1 , we have
2 1 > (1 + ) 1 ,  < 1;
which directly holds. This indicates that it should be much easier to find a R such that a
welfare role for pensions exists.
A numerical example might help us to see the result more clearly. Suppose
u (c) =
c1 
1   ;Gx =  = 11:7775; w = 10;  = :6; R = 1:6406;  = :1;  = 2:
The optimal pension is bs = 5; which is marked by a blue circle in the following figure.
The horizontal axis is the pension level b: The blue line is the optimal saving s without
borrowing constraints. The green line is the life-time utility without borrowing con-
straints. The red line is the life-time utility with borrowing constraints.
Figure A0: Pensions For Sophisticated Agents
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E Optimal pension for naive agents at a corner
Also with naive agents, the PAYG pension crowds out voluntary savings. Hence, it is
possible that the optimal pension is so high that the zero savings corner is binding. It is
also possible, that there is a welfare case for a PAYG pension when taking into account
the zero savings corner. The zero savings corner of the middle-aged is reached if bn  bn
defined by
 uc(w   bn) [1 +Gx(gnm)] +R [1 + Gx(gno )]uc(bn) = 0;
while the zero savings corner of the young is reached if bn  bn > w2 defined by
 uc(w   bn) +Ruc(bn) = 0:
Is it possible by choosing a b sufficiently high that there is a welfare case for the PAYG
pension? If sn = 0 and snr = 0 we have gnm = g
n
o = 0 and
d
m
db
=  uc(cnm) + uc(cno ) = 0;
which gives bn = w2 : But when b
n = w2 ; the young agent’s FOC satisfies
d
y
ds
js=0 =  uc
w
2

+Ruc
w
2

> 0;
which implies that the borrowing constraint is not binding for the young. Therefore, the
optimal pension benefits in this scenario is that bn = bn: Then the whole question can
be reduced to the following problem, where the borrowing constraint is binding only for
the middle-aged and bn  bn:
Since sn = 0 but snr 6= 0 in equilibrium, we have
d
m
db
=   [1 +Gx (gnm)]uc(cnm) + [1 + Gx (lno )]uc(cno )(30)
 1 R
R
[Gx(g
n
m)uc (c
nr
m ) + (1  ) Gx (lno )uc (cnrm )]
and from the corner condition for savings, it follows that
d
m
db

R  1
R

<   [1 +Gx (gnm)]uc(cnm) +
"
Gx(g
n
m)uc (c
nr
m )
+ (1  ) Gx (lno )uc (cnrm )
#
:
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A necessary condition would be
[1 +Gx(g
n
m)]uc (c
n
m) < [Gx(g
n
m) + [1  ] Gx (lno )]uc (cnrm )
or (using that cnrm = crm )
uc (c
n
m)
uc (crm )
<
Gx(g
n
m) + [1  ] Gx (lno )
1 +Gx(gnm)
:
In order to find the optimal pension benefits, the agent needs to compare between

mjb=0; 
mjb=bn ; and 
mjsn=0;snr 6=0:
Assume constant marginal gain-loss Gx(gnm) = Gx (l
n
o ) = , the above condition can
be written
uc (c
n
m)
uc (crm )
< [+ (1  ) ] 
1 + 
:
First, assuming constant absolute risk aversion, a   ucc(cro)uc(cno ) - implies that
 =
R2ucc (c
r
o )
ucc (crm ) +R2ucc (cro )
=
R2ucc(cro )
Ruc(cro )
ucc(crm )
uc(crm )
+ R
2ucc(cro )
Ruc(cro )
=
Ra
a+Ra
=
R
1 +R
:
With constant marginal gain-loss, the parameter  becomes
 =
1 + Gg (l
n
o )
1 +Gg (gnm)
=
1 + 
1 + 
:
The inequality can now be written
uc (c
n
m)
uc (crm )
<

R
1 +R
+
1
1 +R



1 + 
or
(31)
uc (c
n
m)
uc (crm )
<
R+ 
1 +R

1 + 
:
This inequality does not hold for  = 0 (as should be expected, this is the standard
case), since
 = 0 :
uc (c
n
m)
uc (crm )
= 1 > 0 =
R+ 
1 +R

1 + 
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Returning to the inequality (31) we have that the LHS is decreasing in , since  is de-
creasing in ; the RHS is increasing in . This suggests the possibility of a cut-off level of
 ensuring a welfare case for PAYG pensions.
We know that (31) cannot hold for a low value of  - can it hold for a large value?
Note the limit properties:
!  for  !1; 
1 + 
! 1 for  !1
Hence, if it can be established that
(32)
uc (c
n
m)
uc (crm )

=
<
R+ 
1 +R
there exists a  such that the inequality (31) holds for  > . Note that it is only
required that this condition holds when LHS is evaluated for b = 0. Assume the following
functional form for the utility function
u(c) =  e ac; a > 0
and recall the first-order conditions for consumption/savings
uc (c
n
m) = Ruc (c
n
o ) ; uc (c
r
m ) = Ruc (c
r
o ) :
Then it follows (determining consumption/savings for any pensions b, to be able to
find the marginal utilities of consumption)
e a(w s
n b) = Re a(Rs
n+b)
) sn = ln (R) + a (w   2b)
a(1 +R)
:
and therefore
cnm =
R
1 +R

w   b+ b
R

  ln (R)
a(1 +R)
;
cno =
R
1 +R

w   b+ b
R

  R ln (R)
a(1 +R)
:
Using the same procedure we find
crm =
R
1 +R

w   b+ b
R

  ln (R)
a(1 +R)
;
cro =
R
1 +R

w   b+ b
R

  R ln (R)
a(1 +R)
:
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Combining these expression, we get
uc (c
n
m)
uc (crm )
=
e
 
"
aR(w b+ bR) ln(R)
a(1+R)
#
e
 
"
aR(w b+ bR) ln(R)
a(1+R)
# = e ln1+R =  11+R :
Condition (32) can now be written as

1
1+R <
R+ 
1 +R
:
or
1 + 
1 + 
<

R+ 
1 +R
1+R
:
This shows that d
mdb

any b
> 0 if  >  for some large : Therefore, without borrowing
constraints we always have a corner pensions for some  > . Therefore, if  > , there
is a welfare role for pensions and the borrowing constraints must be binding. Note that
crm ; cro is the same as before while cnm = w   b; cno = b: The FOC (30) becomes
d
m
db
=   (1 + ) ae a(w b) + (1 + ) ae ab + a (R  1)
R (1 +R)
h
Re ac
r
m + e ac
r
o
i
:
If the second-order condition is satisfied, we could have an interior pensions bn 2  bn;bn :
F Proof of Lemma 3
The optimal actual and reference consumption can be written as
sn =
w   b   1=R 1=b
1 +  1=R1 1=
; snr =
w   b R 1=b
1 +R1 1=
;
cnm =
 1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=

w   b+ b
R

; cnrm =
R1 1=
1 +R1 1=

w   b+ b
R

;
cno =
1
1 +  1=R1 1=
R

w   b+ b
R

; cnro =
1
1 +R1 1=
R

w   b+ b
R

:
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The ratio of old-age consumption to middle-age consumption can be written as
cno
cnm
=
R
R1 1=
1= = R1=1=;
which is increasing in . Also,
cnm
cnrm
=
 1=R1 1=
1+ 1=R1 1=
R1 1=
1+R1 1=
=
 1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
R1 1=
=
 1=
 
1 +R1 1=

1 +  1=R1 1=
=
1 +R1 1=
1= +R1 1=
;
which is decreasing in . The question boils down to how  depends on b.
For later reference, the loss term is given as
lno =
(cnro )
1    (cno )1 
1  
=
1
   1
"
R
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 
 

R
1 +R1 1=
1 #
w   b+ b
R
1 
;
and hence
@lno
@b
=
lno (   1)
 
1  1R

w   b+ bR
=
lno (   1)
 
1  1R

Y
@lno
@
=

  1


(cno )
1   1 1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
and similarly for the gain term
gnm =
(cnm)
1    (cnrm )1 
1  
=
1
   1
24  R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
!1 
 
 
 1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
!1 35w   b+ b
R
1 
:
@gnm
@b
=
gnm (   1)
 
1  1R

Y
@gnm
@
=

  1


(cnm)
1   1
1 +  1=R1 1=
< 0:
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Turning to the expression for ,   1+Gx(lno )1+Gx(gnm) , it follows that
d
db
=
Gxx (l
n
o )
h
@lno
@
d
db +
@lno
@b
i
[1 +Gx (g
n
m)]  [1 + Gx (lno )]Gxx (gnm)
h
@gnm
@
d
db +
@gnm
@b
i
[1 +Gx (gnm)]
2
implying
(33)
d
db
=
 Gxx (gnm) @g
n
m
@b + Gxx (l
n
o )
@lno
@b
[1 +Gx (gnm)]  Gxx (lno ) @l
n
o
@ + Gxx (g
n
m)
@gnm
@
Using the expression given above for @g
n
m
@b ,
@lno
@b ,
@lno
@ , and
@gnm
@ we get
d
db
=
(   1)  1  1R
Y
 Gxx (gnm) gnm + Gxx (lno ) lno

where
  [1 +Gx (gnm)]  Gxx (lno )

  1


(cno )
1   1 1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
+Gxx (g
n
m)

  1


(cnm)
1  1
1 +  1=R1 1=
The second order condition to the savings problem (14), reads
d2
m
ds2
= [1 +Gx (g
n
m)]ucc (cm) + [1 + Gx (l
n
o )]R
2ucc (co)
+Gxx (g
n
m) [uc (cm)]
2   Gxx (lno )R2 [uc (co)]2 < 0:
which implies
[1 +Gx (g
n
m)]
ucc (cm)
Ruc (cm)
+ [1 + Gx (l
n
o )]
ucc (co)
uc (co)
+uc (co)

Gxx (g
n
m)
2   Gxx (lno )

< 0:
and therefore
 = [1 +Gx (g
n
m)] Gxx (gnm) (cm)1 
1

1
1 +R1 
1
  1=
+Gxx (l
n
o ) (co)
1  1

R1 
1
  1 1=
1 +R1 
1
  1=
> 0;
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which determines the sign of the denominator of ddb :Therefore,
sign

d
db

= sign

 Gxx (gnm)
@gnm
@b
+ Gxx (l
n
o )
@lno
@b

= sign [ Gxx (gnm) gnm + Gxx (lno ) lno ]
Note that
 Gxx (gnm) gnm + Gxx (lno ) lno = Gx (gnm)
Gxx (g
n
m) g
n
m
Gx (gnm)
+ Gx (l
n
o )
Gxx (l
n
o ) l
n
o
Gx (lno )
= (1  ) [Gx (gnm)  Gx (lno )]
where it is assumed that xGxx(x)Gx(x)  1  . Finally
Gx (g
n
m)  Gx (lno ) =
1 + Gx (l
n
o )
1 +Gx (gnm)
Gx (g
n
m)  Gx (lno )
= 1   > 0 since  < 1:
Therefore, if G is of the form in (4) and  > 1, we have
d
db
> 0:
Moreover,
d
db

cno
cnm

> 0;
d
db

cnm
cnrm

< 0:
An increase in the pension b reduces the overconsumption problem; the agent allocates
relatively more consumption into old-age consumption compared with the case without
pensions. The tension between actual and reference consumption when middle-aged is
reduced.
G Proof of Proposition 1
The optimal pension is determined by the expression (see main text),
F ()  1 + 
 1R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
 
 
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
!
:
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Observe that
@F ()
@
=
  2R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
  
 
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
! 1
  1


 
1

 1R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
=  
 2R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
+
 
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
! 1
 
1

 1R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
=
 
1

 1R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
24  1 1 + 1 +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
! 135
=
 
1

 1R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
24   1= +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
! 1
+
 
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
! 135
 0 iff   1 since  < 1:
Therefore, for   1, we have
F ()  1
1 + Gx (lno )
 F (1)  1
1 + Gx (lno )
< 0:
Hence, there is no welfare role for pensions if   1:
Note that if the gain-loss utility is two-part linear, the first-order of the government
becomes
F () =
1
1 + 
;
with
 =
1 + 
1 + 
:
Hence, there is no interior pensions in this case, and thus there is no "double-positive"
result.
H Proof of Lemma 5
Existence of positive pension
The optimal pension is determined by the government’s first-order condition
F () =
1
1 + Gx (lno )
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Note that the loss as old is given as
lno =
(cnro )
1    (cno )1 
1  
=
1
   1
"
1
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 
 

1
1 +R1 1=
1 #
R1 

w   b+ b
R
1 
= A(;R; )Y 1 ;
where
A(;R; )  1
   1
"
1
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 
 

1
1 +R1 1=
1 #
R1   0
and the gain as middle-aged as
gnm =
(cnm)
1    (cnrm )1 
1  
=
1
   1
24  R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
!1 
 
 
 1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
!1 35Y 1 
gnm = B(;R; )Y
1 
where
B(;R; )  1
   1
24  R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
!1 
 
 
 1=R1 1=
1 +  1=R1 1=
!1 35  0;
Hence, using that  < 1 we have
@F (; b)
@
=
  2R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
  
 
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
! 1
  1


 
1

 1R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
=
 
1

 1R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
24   1= +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
! 1
+
 
1 +  1=R1 1=
1 +R1 1=
! 135
< 0 if  > 1:
Hence, for  > 1, F () is decreasing in . The problem, hereon, is to find an interior
solution to the two equations in the two unknowns  and C (27) (28), where C  Y 1 .
Note that A (;R; ) 2 (0;1) and B(;R; ) 2 (0;1) :
(I) Equation (27)
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This equation gives  as an implicit function of C,  = (C). We have that
0  (0) = 1 + Gx (0)
1 +Gx (0)
< 1
Moreover, for any  2 (0; 1), we have the following boundary conditions
1 + Gx (A(;R; )C)
1 +Gx (B(;R; )C)
! 0 <  as C ! 0;
1 + Gx (A(;R; )C)
1 +Gx (B(;R; )C)
! 1 >  as C !1;
Note that () is not monotone in C.
(II) Equation (28).
Define
 : F () = 1
 : F () =
1
1 + Gx (0)
< 1
It follows that
 !  for C ! 0
 !  for C !1
Since F () is declining in ,  < .
The information can now be summarized in the following figure where the red curve
plots (27) (for simplicity assumed monotone) and the curve plots (28).
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Figure A1: Determination of equilibrium  and C
Existence of a solution requires that
0 < 
Since F () is decreasing in  this is equivalent to
F (0) > F ()
or
(34) F

1 + Gx (0)
1 +Gx (0)

>
1
1 + Gx (0)
;
Next we show that the above condition can be satisfied for large Gx(0), a property of
the gain-loss function. Note that if Gx (0) ! 1 the RHS of (34) goes to 0, and the LHS
goes to F () > F (1) = 0, hence the inequality holds for a sufficiently large Gx (0).
For Gx (0) ! 0, we know that the RHS goes to 1 and the LHS to F (1) = 0, violating the
inequality. Finally, using that the LHS of (34) is increasing in Gx (0) while the RHS is
decreasing in Gx (0), there exists a Gx (0) such that (34) holds for any Gx (0) > Gx (0).
Note this does not prove uniqueness, this requires C(C)  0 for all C.
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I Proof of Proposition 2
With  2 (; ) and C (they are independent of w) solved, we can solve sequentially
the following.
Y  = (C)
1
1  ; b =
w   Y 
1  1R
=
R
R  1 (w   Y
) :
gnm = B(
; R; )C; lno = A(
; R; )C:
sn =
w   b   () 1= R 1=b
1 + () 1= R1 1=
; snr =
w   b  R 1=b
1 +R1 1=
;
cnm =
() 1= R1 1=
1 + () 1= R1 1=

w   b + b

R

; cnrm =
R1 1=
1 +R1 1=

w   b + b

R

;
cno =
1
1 + () 1= R1 1=
R

w   b + b

R

; cnro =
1
1 +R1 1=
R

w   b + b

R

:
Wealth range supporting positive pensions and savings
Savings under the optimal pension is therefore
sn =
w  
h
1 + () 1= R 1=
i
b
1 + () 1= R1 1=
=
w  
h
1 + () 1= R 1=
i
R
R 1 (w   Y )
1 + () 1= R1 1=
=
h
1 + () 1= R 1=
i
R
R 1Y
  
h
1
R 1 +
R
R 1 (
) 1= R 1=
i
w
1 + () 1= R1 1=
:
Notice that
h
1 + () 1= R 1=
i
R
R 1Y
 > 0 and
@sn
@w
=  
1+ 1=R 1=R
R 1
1 +  1=R1 1=
< 0
We thus have a situation as illustrated in the figure below (the saving function is, for
simplicity, drawn as a straight line – but this is not generally the case, since  is not a
parameter). The straight positively slope line is showing b = b0 + RR 1w, where b0 =
  RR 1Y :
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Figure A2: Income, savings and pensions
The interesting case is when the savings locus is as in case I, in which case we have
positive pensions and savings for
(35) w 2 [w;w]
where
w :
R
R  1 (w   Y
) = 0, w = Y  > 0
and
w : sn = 0, w =
h
1 + () 1= R 1=
i
RY 
1 + () 1= R1 1=
:
Note that there is no role for pensions if w < w and for w > w the optimal saving
would be negative. Having both positive pensions and voluntary savings requiresw > w
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or h
1 + () 1= R 1=
i
RY 
1 + () 1= R1 1=
> Y ;
which is true directly. Hence, in a dynamically efficient economy the double coinci-
dence of positive pensions and savings is generally possible, i.e. Case I prevails. The
range of wealth w supporting this is
Z =
w
w
> 1:
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